It may be accepted that the perceptual framework through which a social scientist views his data is, in part, a product of his professional training. Thus, it is not surprising that political scientists have some difficulty in viewing political decision-making in the same light as other social choice (Long, 1958 ). Yet, building on the work of such theorists as Luce (1959) and Arrow (1951) , some social scientists have boldly taken that step. This is manifested in Anthony Downs' An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) ; Thomas Schelling' (1958) ; and now in The Calculus of Consent by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962) . These and other efforts to lift political theory out of the abyss of diffused speculation in which it has labored so long are most welcome.
In The Calculus of Consent the unit of analysis is, as with most &dquo;choice&dquo; theory, the individual and his rational choice among transitively ranked alternatives. Since individual decisions, when combined, determine collective action, the authors construct a theory to explain the means by which conflict may be reconciled. In this they lean heavily on theoretical work in welfare economics, the analogy between political and economic choice being maintained throughout the book.
To support such an analogy, two propositions are rejected: (1) that the decisionmaking process is a means of arriving at an absolute truth which will attract all men to its support; and (2) 
